One share. A veto over fundamental change.
INPEX has exactly one Class A share in issue, held by Japan's Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. It is not in the earnings release. It is not in the quarterly. It is one line in the commercial registry, and it decides what cannot happen to the company without a minister's consent.
What this report does
A Japanese company can carry a capital structure that never appears on its income statement, never appears in its earnings release, and appears in the commercial registry only as a name and a number. The terms that decide control and decide the exit price sit one layer down: in the articles of incorporation, in a board resolution taken at issuance, and in agreements filed with nobody.
This report maps those layers. It does not predict Japan and it recommends nothing. It tells you where each term is recorded, and therefore what you can and cannot conclude from the document in front of you.
What is inside
- The nine classes. Japanese law permits companies to vary shares on exactly nine matters, and no others. All nine, with what each does to the holder, and the two structural limits that constrain their use.
- The registration gap. What the registry records, under which article, and what it leaves out — a five-layer map from the earnings release down to the unpublished subscription agreement, with a worked comparison of two real issuers.
- Seven structures. Restricted voting and the one-half cap; call rights; put rights; entire-acquisition classes and the cash squeeze-out; veto classes and what the exchange does about them; class-elected directors, and why a listed issuer cannot have them; venture preferred shares.
- Reading a class as a signal. Five signals about control, dilution and exit — each paired with what it does not prove.
- Four failure modes, ranked by how often the damage is blamed on something else.
- Twelve questions, in the order they should be asked, with the document where each answer lives.
After reading it
- Tell, from a registry extract alone, whether a company has a class that constrains control — and what that extract cannot tell you.
- Distinguish restricted voting shares from a genuine veto structure, which look alike in a summary.
- Explain why Japanese dual-class control runs through unit share numbers rather than votes per share.
- Recognise the class that precedes a cash squeeze-out, and why its creation is a better signal than the tender price.
On using an AI assistant instead
You can ask a general model what Article 108 says, and it will give you a competent summary. What it will not reliably tell you is which of the nine classes appears at a listed issuer, which one the exchange treats as a delisting trigger, why the articles can lawfully omit the number that determines the payout, or which layer of Japanese practice holds the answer.
Every article reference in this report was checked against the text published by the Ministry of Justice, and every company example is tied to a primary source. Where a proposition could not be verified, it is marked and not relied on.
About the author
Written by a licensed Japanese judicial scrivener (司法書士) — the profession that prepares and files the commercial-registry and corporate-law documents this report is built on. The filings are read from the side of Japanese legal and registry practice rather than from the sell side, which is why the question this report asks is not "what does this company earn" but "where is this term written down, and who can see it".
Frequently asked
Is this investment advice?
No. It contains no buy or sell recommendation, no target price, and no view on the merits of any security. It is analysis of how Japanese capital structures are documented.
Can I share it with my team?
The licence covers one reader. For team or firm-wide use, email [email protected] — internal licences are available.
Will it be updated?
This edition is version 1.0, current as at November 2026. Corrections are issued free to buyers of this edition.
Is it in Japanese or English?
English, for readers outside Japan. Japanese statutory terms are given in the original where the term itself matters. You do not need Japanese to use it.
What if I am not sure it is for me?
Read the free sample first — it contains Section 3 in full. If that chapter is not useful to you, the report will not be either.
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Order the report- Version 1.0 · November 2026
- 19 tables · 41 sources
- Corrections issued free
- Licence: one reader
From the free sample
The registry records existence, not terms. Below is the comparison the sample opens with.
| What the reader learns | INPEX | CYBERDYNE (2014) | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| A second class exists | Yes — 1 Class A share | Yes — Class B, unlisted | Art. 911(3)(vii) |
| Shares by class | One | Shown, as a share count | Art. 911(3)(ix) |
| Why control differs from the share count | Only from the class description | Only from the unit numbers | Art. 911(3)(viii), 188(3) |
| Trigger for conversion | Veto scope in the articles | Breakthrough and sunset | Articles, not the registry |
| How the veto is exercised | A ministerial public notice | Not applicable | Outside the corporate documents |